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TRIAL UNDER THE PROPOSED NEW CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
JOHN T. MARTIN*
The purpose of this article is to discuss, from the standpoint of a
practicing lawyer, the changes which would be made in our present trial
practice by the adoption of the proposed new code, and to suggest con-
structive criticisms of the present draft of certain of the proposed provisions.
Many of the proposed changes are not entirely new to our present
Missouri practice and represent but an extension of existing equity rules
to include law cases or the extension of existing appellate rules to trial
practice. No substantial change which is proposed enters an entirely new
and unexplored field, as each such suggested change has its counterpart in
present practice under the new rules governing federal procedure. As is
indicated by the committee notes appended to the Federal Rules, some of
the apparent innovations had been previously included in code revisions
undertaken by some of the states and had been proved practicable and
desirable.
In those respects where no change was contemplated in the existing
practice, the committee which drafted the proposed new code was careful
to follow the language of our present statutes, so that the decisions of the
courts construing such statutes would be applicable to the new provisions
and would continue to control.
PLACE OF TRIAL, TRIAL SETTINGS AND CONTINUANCES
Those provisions of the proposed new code relating to the place of trial,
trial settings and continuances' 'make no consequential changes in the exist-
ing practice.
Under the proposed new code it would be required that trials upon the
merits be conducted in open court, so far as convenient in the regular court
room, and, in no event, outside the county except by agreement of all parties
affected. This requirement, however, would not limit the court in its dis-
position of preliminary matters in advance of trial, it being elsewhere pro-
*Attorney, Sedalia, Mo. LL.B., 1929, University of Missouri.
1. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 9, §§ 1-6.
(123)
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vided 2 that the court might hear and rule upon such matters at such places
and on such notice as it might fix.
Our present statutes8 delegating to circuit clerks the duty of making
up the trial dockets and the arranging of trial settings are so outmoded
that in many circuits the provisions of these statutes are completely ig-
nored, while in others they are followed as a mere matter of form. The
provisions of the proposed new code directing that the setting of trial
dockets be left to the rules and practice of the particular court are merely
declaratory of the practice now generally followed.
The existing statutory provisions governing applications for and the
granting of continuances 4 are incorporated in the proposed new code," ex-
cepting some0 merely declaratory of the court's inherent power to grant
,ontinuances "for good cause"; 7 also excepting those requiring a continuance
as a matter of right where an attorney is a member of the legislature and
files the designated affidavit.8
CONSOLIDATION AND SEPARATE TRIALS
Under our present statute a trial court's right to order the consolidation
for purposes of trial of suits pending before it is limited to suits "founded
alone upon liquidated demands .. .by the same plaintiff, against the same
defendant . ..or by the same plaintiff against several defendants."O This
statute is restrictive of the provisions of the common law authorizing con-
solidations10 and to such an extent that it is of small aid to the court in the
dispatch of its trial work. However, our courts have ruled that this statute
is without application to suits in equity and that a court of equity has the
inherent power to order the consolidation of suits pending before it when-
ever the court in its sound discretion deems such consolidation desirable.11
The proposed new code would in effect extend the equity rule to law actions
and would authorize the court, on its own motion or otherwise, to order
"a joint hearing or trial of any or all matters in issue" in pending actions
2. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 6, § 40.
3. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) §§ 1993-1994.
4. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§ 1086, 1087, 1090, 1091.
5. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 9, §§ 3-6.
6. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§ 1086, 1092.
7. See case cited in Mo. DIGEST, Continuance, Key 7.
8. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1092.
9. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1094.
10. Priddy v. Mackenzie, 205 Mo. 181, 103 S. W. 968 (1907).
11. Owens v. Link, 48 Mo. App. 534 (1892); Manchester Iron Works v.
(Vol. 7
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involving "a common question of law or fact" whenever the court in its
discretion deemed it expedient to do so.12 It is to be assumed that the
discretionary powers so granted would be limited by those considerations
which have been held to limit the power to order consolidations under the
common law.13 The court would be further empowered to make such addi-
tional orders in respect to cases -so consolidated as would tend to avoid
unnecessary costs and delay. This proposed rule conforms to the Federal
Rule on the subject.1"
The provisions of the proposed new code granting to the trial court,
in the furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, power to order
separate trials as to any separate issue or claim or any number of separate
issues or claims involved in any pending action' 5 are but a restatement of
the provisions of our current statute."' The Federal Rule is the same.Y3
JURY TRIAL OF RIGHT
The proposed new code undertakes no change whatever in the right
of trial by jury as now existing; it being expressly provided that "the right
of trial by jury as declared by the constitution 8 or as given by a statute
shall be preserved to the parties inviolate."' 9 The inclusion in the proposed
new section of the provisions of our present statute authorizing a jury trial
of any issue as to whether a release, composition or discharge of plaintiff's
original claim was fraudulently or wrongfully procured, 20 eliminates any
possible question regarding the continuance of the right of a plaintiff to
litigate in an action at law the validity of any release asserted as a bar
to his claim without having first to resort to a proceeding in equity for the
cancellation of such release.
TRALL BY JuRY OR BY THE COURT
The proposed new code would make no change in the prevailing prac-
tice with regard to the waiver of jury trials, it being provided that the parties
Wagner Construction Co., 341 Mo. 389, 10TS. W. (2d) 89 (1937).
12. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 9, § 7(a).
13. 1 C. J. 1124, et seq.
14. Federal Rule 42(a).
15. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art 9, § 7(b).
16. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1102.
17. Federal Rule 42(b).
18. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 9, § 8.
19. Mo. CONST., art. II, § 28; see cases cited in Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) p. 368,
§ 28.
20. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 934.
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shall only be deemed to have waived a jury (1) by failing to appear;
(2) by filing written consent; (3) by oral consent in open court entered
on the minutes; or (4) by entering upon a trial before the court without
objection.21 The first three grounds specified are but a repetition of those
now provided by statute22 and the fourth is but a declaration of the rule
now fixed by court decision. 23 The failure to incorporate in the proposed
new code provisions comparable to those included in the Federal Rules
whereunder an automatic waiver of a jury trial is brought about in the
absence of a written demand therefor, filed within a specified time,24 has
given rise to some criticism, which does not appear to the writer to be well-
founded. If our procedure were such that a failure to demand a jury trial
before a proceeding had reached a certain stage would inconvenience or dis-
rupt the orderly transaction of the business of the court, then there would
exist a justifiable basis for requiring a jury trial to be demanded of record
in advance of the time the proceeding had progressed to that stage. On
the other hand, if no such reason exists, and I see none, any requirement
that a jury trial should be waived unless a demand therefor be made at
some time arbitrarily fixed, would amount to nothing more nor less than
a trap for the unwary. Some would justify such a requirement solely on the
ground that the trial of issues of fact by the court is preferable to trial by
jury. If that be the general view, tlie end should be attained by direct action
looking to the abolition of the right of trial by jury, not by indirection. As
our constitution preserves to litigants trial by jury as a matter of right,
that right should not be infringed upon unnecessarily.
In authorizing the trial court in non-jury cases, on motion or on its
own initiative, to try any issue with an advisory jury,2i the provisions of
the proposed new code are but declaratory of our present statute2 and
present equity rule. However, an innovation in the present equity practice
is contemplated by the further provision "that the court, with the consent
of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose verdict has the same
effect as if trial by jury had been as a matter of right."
21. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art 9, § 9(a).
22. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1101.
23. Hecker v. Bleish, 327 Mo. 377, 37 S. W. (2d) 444 (1931); Bratschi v.
Loesch, 330 Mo. 697, 51 S. W. (2d) 69 (1932).
24. Federal Rule 38.
25. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art 9, § 9(b).
26. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 1100.
[Vol. 7
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Dismissals
a. Voluntary dismissals
The proposed new code provisions dealing with voluntary dismissals
2 7
undertake two major changes in the current practice: First, a reasonable
limitation is placed upon a plaintiff's present unlimited right to voluntarily
dismiss his case without prejudice at any time before final submission; and,.
second, the present involuntary non-suit rule which permits an appeal from
a judgment not affecting the merits is abolished.
The present statute28 in no wise restricts a plaintiff's unlimited right
to voluntarily dismiss his suit at any time befort it is finally submitted to
the jury, or to the court, or to the court sitting as a jury. It is of no con-
sequence that a plaintiff may have exercised such right in any number of
prior suits filed by him upon the same cause of action. In this situation the
door is opened wide to an abuse of that privilege by the plaintiff and no
protection is afforded a defendant against undue harrassment. The draft
of the proposed new code provision" retains the precise language of the
forementioned statute but, in addition, includes provisions to the effect that
where a plaintiff has once voluntarily dismissed his action and thereafter
files the same anew, he shall not be allowed to dismiss without prejudice
after the jury has been impaneled or evidence has been introduced in a non-
jury case, except (1) by filing a stipulation executed by the opposing party,
or (2) on order of the court made on special motion setting forth the grounds
therefor and supported by affidavit. In its present form the proposed new
section is open to the following criticisms:
(a) No saving clause as to pending counterclaims is incorporated; that
is to say, it is not specified that a voluntary dismissal by plaintiff of his
cause of action shall have no effect upon the defendant's right to proceed
with the disposition of any counterclaim asserted in his answer. We now
have a statute expressly providing that a voluntary dismissal by plaintiff
shall leave unaffected any pending counterclaim," which statute the pro-
posed provision ignores and apparently would supplant. Prior to the enact-
ment of such saving statute in-1889, it was the rule in this state that a dis-
27. Mo. PRoP. CODE, Art. 9, § 10.
28. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 1111.
29. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art 9, § 10(a).
30. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1001.
1942]
5
Martin: Martin: Trial under the Proposed New Code
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
missal by plaintiff carried with it any counterclaim of the defendant.8 ' The
Federal Rule of comparable nature8 relating to voluntary dismissals, omits
any saving provision of the type suggested, but it is to be borne in mind
that the Federal Rule does not permit a voluntary dismissal to be taken
after 'service of the defendant's answer. Possibly the committee felt that the
rule enunciated in such cases as State ex rel. Big Bend Quarry Co. v. Wurde-
man,8' and Pioneer Cooperage Co. v. Bland,84 would take care of the dif-
ficulty, as these cases hold that a voluntary dismissal will not be permitted
if it would prejudice or unduly affect the interests of the defendant. How-
ever, it is debatable whether the rule announced in these cases is well
grounded in view of the holding in the great majority of the cases that a
plaintiff has an absolute right of dismissal regardless of the attitude of the
court in the premises."8
(b) In the case of the second ground of exception, to-wit, the one per-
mitting the dismissal without prejudice on order of the court made on mo-
tion, it would be preferable if the court were granted more latitude than the
authority to merely order a dismissal and if it were empowered to make
such order, "upon such terms and conditions, as the court deemed proper."
The Federal Rule is to this effect.
(c) While in its present form the proposed provision inferentially indi-
cates that voluntary dismissals are to be made "with prejudice," it is not
positively and unequivocally so asserted and the use of the phrases "with
prejudice" and "without prejudice" is not a pleasing choice. The writer has
been unable to find any Missouri case satisfactorily and pointedly defining
these terms. If it is intended that a dismissal "with prejudice" should stand
as an adjudication on the merits and a final disposition of the -case, barring
the right to bring or maintain a later case on the same claim or cause of
action, which obviously is the intent, it is difficult to understand why the
committee did not expressly so' state, using the language of the Federal
Rule. Possibly this objection is hypercritical. A dismissal with prejudice
31. Nordmanser v. Hitchcock, 40 Mo. 178 (1867); Fink v. Bruihl, 47 Mo.
173 "(1870); See also Lanyon v. Chesney, 209 Mo. 1, 106 S. W. 522 (1907); Pullis
v. Pullis Bros. Iron Co., 157 Mo. 565, 57 S. W. 1095 (1900).
32. Federal Rule 41a (b).
33. 309 Mo. 341, 274 S. W. 380 (1925).
34. 228 Mo. App. 994, 75 S. W. (2d) 431 (1934).
35. State ex rel. Hahn v. Anderson, 269 Mo. 381, 190 S. W. 857 (1916);
Brandenburger v. Puller, 266 Mo. 534, 181 S. W. 1141 (1916); Lavignon v. Dietzel,
34 S. W. (2d) 92 (Mo. 1931).
[Vol. 7
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has been held in other jurisdictions" to be an adjudication on the merits
and a bar to the bringing or maintenance of a subsequent action.
Few members of the bar will have any objection to the move to abolish
the device of involuntary non-suits. Professor Rudolph Heitz, of the Uni-
versity of Kansas City, is the author of an excellent article discussing the
involuntary nonsuit rule in Missouri which appeared in a recent issue of
the Missouri Law Review.3 7 In that article he properly characterizes the
rule as a judicial invention, the origin of which cannot be traced to any
statute and points out the inconsistencies which inhere in it. An involuntary
nonsuit is defined by our courts as a judgment of dismissal entered on the
solicitation of a plaintiff as the result of an adverse ruling of the court of
such character as to preclude any substantial recovery.38 The judgment
entered on the taking of an involuntary nonsuit is a mere judgment of
dismissal which does not preclude a plaintiff from reinstating his action
with the same ease as though he had voluntarily dismissed.39 The only thing
finally settled by such a judgment is that the plaintiff must pay the accrued
costs. Nevertheless, under the present practice the plaintiff is permitted to
appeal.' But in order to perfect his appeal he must first seek a new trial
(the right to which he already has) by filing a motion to set aside the non-
suit.41 If such motion be overruled he may appeal and on such appeal runs
no risk of an adverse decision on the merits. The only question which can
be decided on such appeal is whether the trial court erred in failing to grant
the plaintiff a new trial.42 On the other hand, if plaintiff's motion to set
aside the involuntary nonsuit be sustained, the defendant may appeal and
on defendant's appeal the court decides whether error was committed in
granting the new trial. 3 Bearing in mind that the plaintiff may ignore the
judgment of involuntary nonsuit and secure a new trial by instituting his
36. Pulley v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry., 122 Kans. 269, 251 Pac. 1100 (1927).
37. Heitz, Voluntary and Involuntary Nonsuits in Missouri (1940) 5 Mo. L.
REv. 131.
38. Hogan-Sunkel Heating Co. v. Bradley, 320 Mo. 185, 7 S. W. (2d) 255
1928).
39. Thompson v. Farmers' Exchange Bank, 333 Mo. 437, 62 S. W. (2d) 803
(1933).
40. Bonanomi v. Purcell, 287 Mo. 436, 230 S. W. 120 (1921); Stith v. New-
berry Co., 336 Mo. 467, 79 S. W. (2d) 447 (1934).
41. Whitfield v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 271 S. W. 52 (Mo. 1925).
42. Chouteau v. Rowse, 56 Mo. 65 (1874); Chouteau v. Rowse, 90 Mo. 191
(1886).43. Turr v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 277 Mo. 235, 209 S. W. 908 (1918).
1942]
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case anew, as a practical matter, all that is finally solved by a burdensome
appeal of this nature is whether the plaintiff or the defendant shall bear the
costs in the dismissed case. The proposed new code would rectify this
anomalous situation by abolishing appeals after dismissals taken by plain-
tiff following an adverse ruling preventing recovery. Under its provisions
if a plaintiff wished to question any ruling of the trial court which denied
him a recovery, he might do so by permitting judgment to go against him
and then appeal. On the other hand, at the time any such adverse ruling
was made, if the plaintiff was doubtful of his case he would be privileged
to dismiss and start anew, but in that situation he would have to carry
the burden of the costs which had accrued and this seems only fair. The
involuntary nonsuit rule has been unduly burdensome upon defendants but,
on the other hand, it has at times been resorted to by defendant for the sole
purpose of delay. There can be no logical reason for permitting any appeal
from a judgment not determinative of the merits, so that, if on appeal the
judgment of the trial court be affirmed, there will be a final end to the
litigation.
b. Involuntary dismissals
In providing that the trial court may order the dismissal of any case
for failure on the part of the plaintiff to comply with the provisions of the
code or any order of the court,4 4 the proposed new code follows the language
of the present statute.45 Independent of statute our courts have the inherent
power to dismiss a case for failure of the plaintiff to comply with the rules
or orders of the court or to prosecute his claim with reasonable dispatch. 40
The defect in the proposed provision as now drafted is that it does not
provide that any such dismissal by the court shall be with prejudice or,
preferably, shall operate with the force and effect of an adjudication upon
the merits, marking a final end to the controversy. Again the committee has
failed to follow the provisions of the similar Federal Rule.41 Absent such
provision there is no authority in the trial court to do more than dismiss the
case without prejudice. 48 The omission is undoubtedly attributable to the
44. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 9 § 11.
45. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 1241.
46. Guhman v. Grothe, 142 S. W. (2d) 1 (Mo. 1940).
47. Federal Rule 41(b).
48. Scott v. Rees, 300 Mo. 123, 253 S. W. 998 (1923), holding that where a
plaintiff failed to appear and prosecute his claim the court was powerless to ad-judicate the merits and deprive the plaintiff of his right to bring another suit.
8
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thought that plaintiff might be unjustly deprived of his rights by arbitrary
action of the court. If needs be, the rule could be refrained to afford any
needed protection against such contingency.
The proposed new code provision under discussion treats of another
type of involuntary dismissal on order of the court, to-wit, a dismissal by
the court on motion of the defendant at the conclusion of plaintiff's evi-
dence, on the ground that plaintiff has failed to make his case. Obviously,
this provision has application only to the trial of non-jury cases; for where
a jury is utilized in the trial of an action at law, the proper motion for
the defendant to file would be a motion for a directed verdict, for-which
provision is elsewhere made. As a motion for a dismissal is the proper motion
to raise the question of the sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence in an equity
case, 49 it seems evident that what is here undertaken is an extension of the
present equity rule to include the trial of actions at law wherein a jury has
been waived. In equity a judgment of dismissal is the proper judgment entry
where the merits are determined in defendant's favor and such judgment
is res adjudicata as to defendant's claim.?' If this analysis of the intent
of the new proposal be correct, then it will prove enlightening to consider the
situation in an equity case where a motion for a dismissal is filed at the
conclusion of plaintiff's evidence. In the comparatively early case of Leeper
v. Bates,51 our supreme court held that a defendant in an equity case should
have an opportunity to challenge the sufficiency of the case made by plain-
tiff without waiving his right to put in his evidence if the court ruled plain-
tiff's evidence sufficient. The proposed new code provision conforms by pro-
viding that any such motion to dismiss shall not 6perate as a waiver of
defendant's right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted.
Does this provision against waiver afford adequate protection to the defend-
ant and guarantee him his right to put on evidence in support of his defense?
The answer is, "No." A consideration of the defendant's position in an
equity case if the trial court sustains his motion to-dismiss and the plaintiff
appeals will prove enlightening. The case of Fudlerton v. Fullerton, 2 de-
49. Jacobs v. Cauthorn, 293 Mo. 154, 238 S. W. 443 (1922); Troll v. Spencer,
238 Mo. 81, 141 S. W. 855 (1911), holding that demurrers to the evidence fulfill
no office in an equity case.
50. 34 C. J. 788.
51. 85 Mo. 224 (1884).
52. 345 Mo. 216, 132 S. W. (2d) 966 (1939). See also Troll v. Spencer, 238
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cided by the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1939, was an appeal from a
judgment in a proceeding in equity entered in- defendant's favor at the
conclusion of plaintiff's evidence on defendant's motion challenging the suf-
ficiency thereof. The court held that the effect of such motion was to volun-
tarily submit the case on the evidence adduced and thus authorize the
appellate court to review the merits de novo and enter a final decree in
plaintiff's favor if in its view plaintiff's evidence entitled him to the relief
prayed. An amendment of this proposed section to remove the hazard sug-
gested would seem in order. This could be accomplished by requiring the
remand for a new trial upon the reversal of any judgment of dismissal entered
in a non-jury case pursuant to a motion tendered at the conclusion of
plaintiff's evidence.
c. Miscellaneous
Under the proposed new code the forementioned provisions relating
to the disnissal of plaintiff's actions would be made applicable to the dis-
missal of counterclaims, cross-claims, and third party claims." It would be
provided further that any plaintiff who had once dismissed an action in
any court and who thereafter instituted a new action upon or including the
same claim against the same defendant, might be ordered by the court to
pay the costs in the first action before being permitted to proceed in the
new one.54 While this is an expression of the Federal Rule on the same
subject," its adoption would work no substantial change in our existing
practice. Our courts have the inherent power to stay such a second suit
until the costs in the first action have been paid where the circumstances
support the charge that the second proceeding is vexatious." It would only
extend the court's inherent power by permitting an order staying the proceed-
ings where the dismissed action had pended in the courts of a foreign state
or in the federal courts, and by authorizing the court to order the payment
of the costs in the former case and dismiss plaintiff's case in the event of
non-compliance.
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES
The adoption of the proposed new code would bring about a very
material change with regard to the preservation of the point on appeal that
53. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art 9, § 12.
54. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art 9, § 13.
55. Federal Rule 41(d).
56. Hewitt v. Steele, 136 Mo. 237, 38 S. W. 82 (1896).
[Vol. 7
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error was committed by the trial court in the giving of instructions. Under
the current practice, in order to preserve the right on appeal to object to the
giving of an instruction on any ground, it is only necessary that a formal,
general exception be taken at the time the instruction is given, without the
necessity of indicating the ground for objection. 7 It is, of course, necessary
to further preserve the point by charging in the motion for a new trial that
error was committed in the giving of the instruction, but again the charge
may be general and without a specification of the ground for objection. 8
The provisions of the proposed new code would require that objections to
instructions, with a distinct statement of the grounds therefor, be made in
the course of the trial before the jury retires to consider its verdict, and
would deprive a party of the right to complain on appeal of the giving of
any instruction on any ground not included in such objection. This innova-
tion would bring to our Missouri practice the Federal Rule relating to ob-
jections to instructions as it existed prior to the adoption of the new
Federal Rules and as it is now embodied therein.60
Our present practice as above outlined is one of the major factors con-
tributing to the delays and uncertainties of our present system. It is com-
mon knowledge that a large percentage of reversals on appeal come as the
result of errors in instructions. If a party is forced to disclose his objections
at the time the instruction is given, then the trial court is at least given an
opportunity to correct the objectionable matter. At present there are many
cases in which a party, by failing to point out defects in the instructions
given, can safely permit a case to be submitted to the jury and take his
chances on a favorable verdict without risking an unfavorable verdict which
will stand. Many times an appeal can be taken with like security. The
federal practice has worked satisfactorily in the feder'al courts and there is
no reason why the same practice should not work satisfactorily in our state
courts. Probably we would accept the suggested change with less hesitation
if the new provisions required the trial court to afford attorneys reasonable
time and opportunity to study the instructions of the opposition for the
purpose of framing their objections. However, it cannot be doubted that
under the provision as it now stands the failure of the trial court to grant
57. Harding v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 232 Mo. 444, 134 S. W. 641 (1911).
58. Wampler v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 269 Mo. 464, 190 S. W. 908 (1910).
59. Mo. PROP. CoDE, Art 9, § 14.
60. Federal Rule 51.
11
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to the parties a reasonable opportunity to study the opposition's instructions
would afford grounds- for reversal on appeal.
ALTERNATIVE PROVISIONS AS TO GENERAL AND SPECIAL VERDICTS AND
INTERROGATORIES
The writer has been requested to omit from this paper any discussion
of the alternative provisions suggested by the committee in the matter of
verdicts and interrogatories, but it is not possible to pass the matter without
voicing the opinion that a grave mistake will be made if we fail to include
in the proposed revision the equivalent of the Federal Rules on this subject."'
Under such rules, where a case is submitted to a jury for a general verdict, it
is required that the jury answer special interrogatories on the issues of fact
necessary to support any general verdict. Unless the facts found in answer
to the interrogatories substantiate the general verdict returned, that verdict
cannot stand. The Federal Rule requires nothing more than that the jury
actually perform its theoretical duty, to-wit, the determination of the issues
of fact. Our present practice of permitting general verdicts, unsupported
by any specific findings of fact, is the greatest weakness in our system, and
no other circumstance contributes more to the uncertainties of litigation.
MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICTS
Under the proposed new code demurrers to the evidence and motions
for peremptory instructions would be abolished and in their place would
be substituted motions for verdicts, to be used in the same manner and to
fulfill the same office. 2 This change is not one of substance. However, a
very material change would be made in the present practice relating to the
disposition of such motions. It would be provided 3 that the court might
reserve its ruling on any such motion tendered at the conclusion of all the
evidence, send the case to the jury, and later, during the pendency of a
motion to set aside the verdict and enter judgment for the defendant, re-
consider the question of law presented. At the time such motion is ruled
upon, if the court should be then of the opinion that the motion for a directed
verdict should have been sustained, it could, in its discretion, either grant
a new trial or enter judgment for the defendant, setting aside any verdict
to the contrary. The change proposed is one more to be desired.
61. Federal Rule 49.
62. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 9, § 17.
63. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 9, § 18.
L[Vol. 7
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Under our present practice the trial court, in the confusion and press
of a trial, is asked to rule hastily upon the questions raised by a request that
a case be taken from the jury. Often nice questions of law are presented
which first come to the trial court's attention when the request is made.
Although the court may feel that the defendant's position is well taken,
there is the knowledge that such impression is not founded upon conclusions
reached through deliberate study and there is a resulting hesitancy to take
the case from the jury, influenced by the knowledge that if such action
should later prove ill-considered, the damage could not be rectified except
through a new trial, with its attendant expense both to the plaintiff and
to the county. After a case wherein the defendant's demurrer should have
been sustained has been sent to the jury and a verdict for plaintiff re-
turned, in passing on the motion for a new trial, the trial court finds itself
in a dilemma. At present its authority is limited to the granting or over-
ruling of the motion for a new trial. If the motion be granted, a new trial
and all the expense it entails is in the offing, though the court may know
that the plaintiff cannot make a case. While, on the other hand, if the
motion is overruled, the burden of an appeal to correct the error is thrown
on the defendant. But the latter course offers the most satisfactory solution
of the problem, for then the responsibility can be shifted to the higher court
wlhich has tlhe power, if it concludes that plaintiff's case is insufflCient, to
reverse the case outright and order the entry of a judgment in defendant's
favor, thus putting an end to the litigation. 4 What is proposed is nothing
more nor less than the extension of the present appellate rule to trial court
practice, through the granting to the trial court of the same power and
authority now exercised by the appellate court on appeal.
There is only one just criticism which can be made of the proposed
change and that is that it would operate to deprive the plaintiff of his right
to voluntarily dismiss upon learning of the adverse view of the court on
the law. But this objection has been made regarding the appellate court
rule and after full consideration has been disallowed.6 5
The power to reverse outright will not be exercised by the appellate
court whenever it appears that the plaintiff might be able to supplement his
proof and make up the deficiency, if given another trial, and in such situa-
64. Strottman v. St. Louis Iron Mountain & Southern Ry., 228 Mo. 154, 128
S. W. 187 (1910); Byrne v. Prudential Ins. Co., 88 S. W. (2d) 344 (Mo. 1935).
65. See note 64, supra.
1942]
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tion the court will reverse and remand the case for a new trial. With like
effect the proposed new code would grant to the trial court power in its
discretion to grant a new trial and undoubtedly its discretion would be lim-
ited by such consideration. Its abuse of discretion in entering judgment for
the defendant, rather than granting a new trial which would enable the
plaintiff to supplement his proof, would afford grounds for an appeal and
the reversal and remand of the case.
A motion of the character under discussion, that is, a motion after
verdict to reconsider the ruling of a motion for a directed verdict, could
be joined with a motion for a new trial and with relief prayed in the alterna-
tive. While the requirement is made that any such motion must be filed
within ten days after the rendition of verdict or the discharge of the jury,
there is a question as to whether the court, under other provisions of the
proposed new code,6" would be empowered to enlarge such ten day period.
The provisions of the proposed new code conform to the Federal Rule."'
FINDINGS BY THE COURT
By present statute,68 on any trials by the court wherein a jury has been
waived, either party may request the court to state in writing its findings
of fact and conclusions of law. The provisions of this statute have been
carried into the proposed new code,"9 with a change in the language to
make the provision cover all actions tried upon the facts without a jury,
those at law as well as those of equitable cognizance. As construed by the
court, the statute has no application to suits in equity wherein the trial
court is privileged to enter a general judgment irrespective of the demands
of either party litigant70
The suggested provision under discussion undertakes a further change
of marked significance in regard to the practice in law actions tried by the
court without a jury, in that on appeal the appellate court would be author-
ized and empowered to review the trial court's findings of fact and, should
it find them clearly erroneous, to set the same aside. The findings of the
66. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art 1, § 10.
67. Federal Rule 50.
68. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1103. Kuczma v. Droszkowski, 243 Mo. 57, 147
S. W. 1000 (1912).
69. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 9, § 19(a).
70. Walther v. Null (banc), 233 Mo. 104, 134 S. W. 993 (1910); Fruin v.
O'Malley, 241 Mo. 250, 145 S. W. 437 (1912).
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trial court, whether made generally or specially, and irrespective of any
request for special findings, would be subject to such review on appeal. What
is here undertaken is the extension of the reviewing power of the appellate
court in equity cases"' to law cases tried without a jury. What is proposed
is an adoption of the new Federal Rule on the subject 2 which in turn re-
flects a reform previously undertaken in a number of the states.7 3
At present the findings of fact made by the trial court in jury waived
cases are binding upon the appellate court with like force and effect as a jury
verdict.7 4 On appeal the court cannot now disturb the trial court's findings
if there is any evidence in the record to support them. Under the present
practice the waiver of a jury in a law case in practical effect may amount
to an agreement that whatever decision the trial judge may reach will be
accepted as final. This consideration has been a great deterrent to the waiver
of juries in law cases. The change proposed should encourage parties to waive
jury trials, as it would give them the assurance that any obvious injustice
done by the trial court could be corrected through an appeal. In appeals
in equity cases the appellate courts have shown no hesitancy to correct
obvious miscarriages of justice.
A further change in the practice is contemplated by the proposed code
in that it would authorize the trial court, following the entry of judgment
in a non-jury case, upon motion filed within ten days after the entry of judg-
ment, to amend its findings or make additional findings and amend its judg-
ment accordingly, and such motion could be included in a motion for a new
trial. This conforms to the Federal Rule. 5 Under our present practice the
trial court has full authority to change or amend any judgment at any time
during the term and for any reason.7 6 The change proposed is merely to
extend the time during which the court may exercise such authority by
eliminating the restriction that the court must act during the term and in
its stead providing that such action may be taken at any time during the
pendency of such motion. The Federal Rule has been construed as depriving
71. Uhrig v. Hill-Behan Lumber Co., 341 Mo. 851, 110 S. W. (2d) 412 (1937).
72. Federal Rule 52 (a).
73. See committee notes appended to Federal Rule 52.
74. Idalia Realty & Development Co. v. Norman's Southeastern Ry., 219 S.
W. 923 (Mo. 1920); Meinhardt v. White, 341 Mo. 446, 107 S. W. (2d) 1061 (1937).
75. Federal Rule 52 (a).
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the trial court of the power to make any such change or amendment after
an appeal had been taken, unless the cause is first remanded. 77
Whether the court would have the authority to extend the time for the
filing of any such motion beyond the ten day period specified is a debatable
question.78
MoTioNs AFTER VERDICT OR JUDGMENT
Under the proposed new code, as under the present practice, a motion
for a new trial would be the proper motion to question any verdict, finding,
or judgment.
In the case of jury trials, in ruling upon any such motion the trial court
would be authorized to order a new trial as to one or more of the parties
and as to part or all of the issues.7' The change proposed is nothing more
nor less than a recognition of the same power in the trial court that is now
exercised by the appellate court on appeal. On appeal the appellate court
may affirm a judgment as to one or more of the parties or as to one or more
of the issues and may remand the case for a new trial as to the other parties,
or as to a part of the issues.80
As to al cases tried without a jury, the proposed new code would permit
the trial court, during the time it had under consideration any motion for
a new trial, to open the judgment, if one had been entered, take additional
testimony, amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law, make new
findings and conclusions, and enter a new judgment in conformity there-
with."" Again, this grants the trial court no greater power than it now has
if it acts during the term at which the judgment is entered8 2 and only
changes the present practice by extending the time during which the court
may take such action.
It should be noted that the provisions prepared in regard to the power
of the court to grant a new trial do not embody the present statutory lim-
itation which prohibits a trial court from granting a party more than one
new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evi-
77. Miller v. United States, 114 F. (2d) 267 (C.A.A. 7th, 1940); Fiske v.
Walace, 115 F. (2d) 1003 (C.C.A. 8th, 1940).
78. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 1, § 10.
79. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 9, § 20.
80. Hoelzel v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry., 337 Mo. 61, 85 S. W. (2d) 126 (1935).
81. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 9, § 20.
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dence.83 Otherwise, leaving the power to grant or refuse a motion for a new
trial entirely to the sound discretion of the court is in accord with the present
practice.8'
Under the suggested rule a motion for a new trial would be required
to be filed within ten days after the entry of judgment,85 instead of "within
four days after the trial, if the term shall so long continue; and if not, before
the end of the term, as now required by statute."'" The ten day period
could not be enlarged by the court.87 If the motion for a new trial should
be based upon affidavits, the opposing party would have ten days after
service within which to file counter-affidavits, which period might be ex-
tended either by the court or by stipulation of the parties for an additional
twenty days, with the power in the court to permit reply affidavits. 8 Upon
its own initiative within ten days following the entry of judgment the court
would be authorized to grant a new trial for any reason for which it might
have granted a new trial on motion of the party, specifying in its order
the grounds therefor.8 9
The proposed code would dispense with the necessity of filing a motion
for a new trial in order to preserve the right to complain on appeal of any
error committed by the trial court in passing upon any objection made in
the course of the trial, and it would only be essential to the preservation
of such right of complaint to include in the motion for a new trial any matter
with respect to which the trial court had been given no opportunity to rule. 0
In other words, no such motion would be required to permit a party to
attack a judgment on appeal on any ground involving error committed by
the trial court in ruling upon any objection, but such motion would only
be necessary to preserve complaints as to matters which had not been
brought to the trial court's attention during the course of the trial, such
as the amount of the verdict, misconduct of the jury in its deliberations, etc.
The new code would also abolish motions in arrest of judgment and
83. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1125. Gray v. City of Hannibal, 29 S. W. (2d)
710 (Mo. 1930).
84. Schipper v. Brashear Truck Co., 132.S. W. (2d) 993 (Mo. 1939); Taylor
v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry., 333 Mo: 650, 63 S. W. (2d) 69 (1933).
85. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 9, § 21.
86. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1171.
87. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 1, § 10.
88. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 9, § 22.
89. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 9, § 23.
90. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 9, § 24.
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motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.91 This change would
not affect our existing practice as such motions have already been abolished
by the decision of our supreme court in the case of City of St. Louis v.
Senter Commission Co. 92 In that case it was held that a motion in arrest
of judgment fulfilled no function, as it was the duty of the appellate court
to examine the record and consider all errors apparent on the face thereof,
irrespective of the filing of any motion for a new trial or in arrest of judg-
ment. What was said in that- case in regard to motions in arrest of judgment
applies with equal force to motions for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, as both such motions must relate to defects appearing on the face of
the record.9"
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
a. Disability of judge
The proposed new code would provide that in the event of death, sick-
ness or other disability of the judge before whom a case has been tried and
a verdict returned or, in a non-jury case, where his findings of fact and con-
clusions of law had been filed, any other judge regularly sitting or assigned
might perform all further necessary functions.94 This is in accord with and
in extension of the purpose and intent of our present statute95 authorizing
the allowance of a bill of exceptions by a succeeding or acting judge where
the judge who heard the case has gone out of office. This statute has been
construed as permitting the acting or succeeding judge, in the circumstances
mentioned, to rule on a motion for a new trialY5
b. Exceptions unnecessary
The necessity of taking formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the
-trial court would be dispensed with by the proposed code.9T It would only
be necessary for a party to make known to the trial court the action which
he desired the court to take or his objection to the action taken by the
court, with a statement of his grounds. In most, if not all, of our circuit
91. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art 9, § 25.
92. 340 Mo. 633, 102 S. W. (2d) 103 (1937).
93. See article by Judge Hyde entitled Motions after Verdict to Suspend or
Prevent Final Judgment (1938) 6 KAN. CITY L. REV. 163.
94. MO. PROP. CODE, Art. 9, § 26.
95. Mo- REV. STAT. (1939) § 1178.
96. State v. Messino, 325 Mo. 743, 30 S. W. (2d) 750 (1930).
97. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 9, § 27.
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courts, exceptions to adverse rulings are saved as a matter of course. How-
ever, if it develops on appeal that through inadvertence there was a failure
on the part of the reporter to note an exception and the appellants attorney
overlooked such oversight, the appellate court will take no notice of the
point. Such a slip has been made in relation to motions for a new trial
with disasterous consequences. The retention in our present code of the
requirement of formal exceptions illustrates the obsolescence of that code
and the urgent need of reform.
c. Harmless error
The proposed new code would provide that after the rendition of a
verdict or judgment, it should not be disturbed for any error or defect not
substantially affecting the rights of the parties." This is but a statement
of the rule which has been heretofore followed and a statement of the pro-
visions of our statutes having to do with appellate practice. 9
CONCLUSION
In preparing this article the writer has obtained a fuller appreciation
of the inadequacies of our present code than he had before the work was
undertaken. All of us have known that our present code is antiquated.
However, until the proposed new code was drafted, few of us were aware
of the full -extent of its imperfections and few had concrete ideas as to
how the imperfections could be satisfactorily remedied. No one will contend
that the proposed code is perfect, but without doubt it would be a-great
improvement over our present one.
The proposed changes will not make the practice of law any easier for
the lawyers, whatever the class of business handled. Such is not the pur-
pose of a revision, as the writer sees it. We lawyers can get along under
the present code so long as our clients continue to seek our aid and advice.
The demand for a revision comes from the public we serve which has evi-
denced its displeasure with the present system by its increasing willingness
to have controversies settled by administrative bodies. Unless we lawyers
modernize our system, we may expect to see a continued shrinkage in the
volume of business moving through our courts.
98. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art 9, § 28.
99. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§ 1228, 1265, 1266.
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